Tracking the train of thought from the laboratory into everyday life: An experience-sampling study of mind wandering across controlled and ecological contexts by Kane, Michael J. et al.
Tracking the train of thought from the laboratory into everyday life: An experience-sampling 
study of mind wandering across controlled and ecological contexts 
 
By: Jennifer C. McVay, Michael J. Kane, and Thomas R. Kwapil  
 
McVay, J.C., Kane, M.J., & Kwapil, T.R. (2009). Tracking the train of thought from the laboratory into 
everyday life: An experience-sampling study of mind-wandering across controlled and ecological 
contexts. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 857-863.  
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
Made available courtesy of the Psychonomic Society: http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.5.857 
 
Abstract: 
 
In an experience-sampling study that bridged laboratory, ecological, and individual-differences approaches to 
mind-wandering research, 72 subjects completed an executive-control task with periodic thought probes 
(reported by McVay & Kane, 2009) and then carried PDAs for a week that signaled them eight times daily to 
report immediately whether their thoughts were off task. Subjects who reported more mind wandering during 
the laboratory task endorsed more mind-wandering experiences during everyday life (and were more likely to 
report worries as off-task thought content). We also conceptually replicated laboratory findings that mind 
wandering predicts task performance: Subjects rated their daily-life performance to be impaired when they 
reported off-task thoughts, with greatest impairment when subjects’ mind wandering lacked metaconsciousness. 
The propensity to mind wander appears to be a stable cognitive characteristic and seems to predict performance 
difficulties in daily life, just as it does in the laboratory. 
 
Article: 
 
The study of mind wandering provides a novel means to explore fundamental issues of consciousness. For ex-
ample, the commonplace experience of moving one’s eyes across a page without comprehending a thing 
suggests the startling conclusion that we are sometimes unaware of our own conscious experience; if we 
―knew‖ our thoughts were elsewhere, we would return to reading or drop the charade (Schooler, Reichle, & 
Halpern, 2004). Moreover, despite controversy about the causal functions of consciousness (e.g., Morsella, 
2005; Rosenthal, 2008; Wegner, 2002), field and laboratory studies of human performance (e.g., Reason, 1990; 
Smallwood et al., 2004) indicate that errors increase when people report experiencing task-unrelated thoughts 
(TUTs). Mind wandering thus co-occurs with events of scientific and practical interest. It is also beginning to 
figure into general theories of executive control, metacognition, and the ―default mode‖ brain network (e.g., 
Bar, 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Burgess, Dumontheil, & Gilbert, 2007; Mason et al., 2007; Schooler, 
2002; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006); we have argued, for example, that unwanted mind-wandering experiences 
represent momentary failures of goal maintenance that reflect, in part, enduring individual differences in 
executive control (Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009). 
 
Like most areas of cognitive investigation, mind-wandering research is dominated by laboratory and 
neuroimaging methods; here, subjects engage in an ongoing task that is periodically interrupted for them to 
report or categorize their current thoughts (e.g., as on or off task; Giambra, 1995; Mason et al., 2007; 
Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). Such thought-probe responses appear to be valid: TUT reports 
vary systematically with experimental manipulations, such as memory load, stimulus pacing, and task practice 
(e.g., Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 1966; Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993); TUTs show a 
reliable neural signature (e.g., Mason et al., 2007); and task errors can increase by 25% during TUTs as opposed 
to on-task thoughts (McVay & Kane, 2009; Schooler et al., 2004). As well, individual differences in TUT rates 
are reliable across different primary tasks and across substantial test–retest lags (Giambra, 1995; Grodsky & 
Giambra, 1990/1991) and they are predicted by objective cognitive ability assessments (McVay & Kane, 2009). 
 
Unlike some heavily investigated cognitive phenomena, however, mind wandering seems ubiquitous in 
everyday life. Perhaps for this reason, researchers have also investigated TUTs in ecologically valid contexts, 
by inserting thought probes into normal classroom activities (e.g., Cameron & Giuntoli, 1972; Geerligs, 1995) 
or by electronically paging (―beeping‖) subjects to answer questions about their thoughts, emotions, and 
environmental context during unconstrained daily activities (e.g., Hurlburt, 1979). As in laboratory studies, 
daily-life mind wandering occurs frequently and it varies reliably with context: Subjects report TUTs on 30%–
40% of probes, overall (e.g., Klinger & Cox, 1987/1988), but they occur more often during classroom lectures 
than during discussions (e.g., Schoen, 1970), and less often during enjoyable activities and happy moods (e.g., 
Kane et al., 2007). 
 
 
 
The goal of the present work was to bridge the controlled and ecological approaches to mind-wandering 
research by asking whether people who experience more (or fewer) TUTs during a challenging laboratory task 
also experience more (or fewer) TUTs in daily life. If mind wandering reflects, in part, executive-control failure 
(Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009) and if executive-control capabilities are domain general (e.g., Engle 
& Kane, 2004), then subjects’ TUT rates in the lab should predict those outside the lab. To test this prediction, 
we administered a daily-life experience-sampling protocol to subjects who had previously completed a 
laboratory assessment of mind wandering during an executive-control, go/no-go task, the sustained attention to 
response task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004). McVay 
and Kane reported that these subjects experienced frequent mind wandering, high error rates, quite variable 
response times to ―go‖ trials, and significant associations among the three. 
 
Our secondary goal was to examine the relation between mind wandering and performance in daily life, a 
relation that is well established in the laboratory (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009; Schooler et al., 2004; Smallwood, 
McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). We therefore asked subjects to evaluate their performance of ongoing activities 
on the same occasions on which we probed their thoughts. We expected that in life, as in the lab, subjects would 
report performing less well when mind wandering than during on-task thinking. 
 
METHOD 
 
Laboratory SART 
 
The SART presented 1,810 words for go/no-go responses based on a perceptual (letter case) or semantic 
(animals vs. foods) discrimination. Subjects pressed a key for nontarget ―go‖ stimuli (e.g., lowercase words) 
and withheld responses to infrequent (11%) target ―no-go‖ stimuli (e.g., uppercase words; for details, see 
McVay & Kane, 2009). 
 
Thought-probe screens followed 60% of the no-go targets and presented the question, ―What were you just 
thinking about?‖ with the following response options: (1) the task; (2) own task performance; (3) everyday 
stuff; (4) current state of being; (5) personal worries; (6) daydreams; and (7) other. We instructed subjects to re-
port what they had been thinking immediately before the probe, and the experimenter initially elaborated on the 
response option meanings. For all analyses, Options 3–7 were considered TUTs. 
 
 
 
 
Subjects 
 
Of 244 undergraduates (aged 18–35) who completed the laboratory SART, 72 subsequently completed the 
experience-sampling study (ESM). Subjects began the 7-day ESM collection period between 1 and 63 days (M 
= 16; SD = 13) after the laboratory session, on the basis of their availability. This subsample had laboratory 
TUT rates similar to the full sample’s (both Ms = .55) and similar levels of SART performance [M signal 
detection accuracy (dL) = 3.73 vs. 3.35, respectively; mean go-trial response time (RT) variability (RTSD) = 151 
msec vs. 158 msec, respectively]; for analyses of the full sample, see McVay and Kane (2009).
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Experience-Sampling Protocol 
 
Palm Pilot PDAs using iESP software (Barrett & Barrett, 2004; Intel Corp., 2004) presented questionnaires and 
collected data during subjects’ daily-life activities. A ―beep‖ signaled subjects to complete eight daily 
questionnaires, between noon and midnight, for 7 full days. The signals occurred once randomly during each 
90-min block. During a 60-min training session, the experimenter instructed subjects to take immediate stock of 
their thoughts upon the beep and to report on only these thoughts; the experimenter also familiarized subjects 
with the PDAs, questionnaires, and mind-wandering examples. PDA signal blocks began immediately after 
subjects left the session (yielding an additional, partial day of data collection). Subjects completing ≥70% of the 
questionnaires were entered into a lottery for a retailer gift card. 
 
The PDA questionnaire first asked subjects whether their current thoughts had wandered from their activity (1 = 
yes; 0 = no). If so, they answered 5 questions about those thoughts; all subjects also answered 18 questions 
about their mental and environmental context (all on a 1–7 scale; see Tables 1 and 2). 
 
Statistical Analyses 
 
Experience-sampling data have a hierarchical structure in which responses (Level 1 data) are nested within 
subjects (Level 2 data) and are best analyzed with multilevel or hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We used HLM to examine within- and between-subjects predictors of two daily-
life outcomes: mind wandering and subjective evaluation of activity performance. All Level 1, within-subjects 
variables (e.g., self-reported happiness) were standardized within subjects (group centered). The mind-
wandering variable was dichotomous (on task vs. TUT), which violates the normality assumption of HLM; we 
therefore used an HLM model for binary outcomes (using a log transformation and Bernoulli sampling 
distribution, a special case of the binomial distribution where the values are 0 and 1; see Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002) to evaluate Level 1 and Level 2 effects on TUTs. We analyzed three Level 2 between-subject predictors 
of thought and performance (grand-mean centered): SART session TUT rate, dL, and RTSD. 
 
RESULTS 
 
We report nondirectional NHSTs (α = .05) with prep values. On average, subjects completed 45.6 (SD = 10.8, 
range = 20–65) usable questionnaires, which were uncorrelated with daily-life [r(72) = −.04] and laboratory 
[r(72) = −.13] TUT rates. 
 
Mind Wandering in Daily Life 
 
Our initial analyses examined the frequency and nature of daily-life mind wandering. Consistent with previous 
findings, subjects reported TUTs at 30% of the beeps, on average, with considerable variation among subjects 
(SD, 15%; range, 6%–75%). Table 1 presents mean ratings of thought content and awareness when subjects 
reported mind wandering; replicating Kane et al. (2007), subjects generally reported more personal-concern 
content than fantasy, and more fantasy than worry (but these categories were not mutually exclusive, because 
concern-related content might intrude into worries or daydreams; see Klinger, 1971). Also replicating the 
findings from Kane et al. (2007), mind wandering varied significantly with context (Table 2), increasing with 
stress, boredom, sleepiness, or chaotic environments, and decreasing with concentration, effort, successful 
performance, enjoyable tasks, or happiness. However, in contrast to Kane et al., TUTs decreased during more 
important and more effortful activities and did not increase during schoolwork.
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 In general, these findings are 
congruent with Klinger’s ―current concerns‖ theory, which argues that thoughts about one’s current goals will 
be especially likely to intrude into consciousness when they are cued by the environment, particularly during 
less important or less goal-relevant tasks (Klinger, 1971, 1999; see Kane et al., 2007, for further discussion of 
contextual predictors of mind wandering). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For our primary question—about the stability of off-task thinking—we evaluated the effects of our three 
laboratory variables on daily-life mind wandering using a model that included the significant Level 1 context 
variables from Table 2. As hypothesized, subjects with higher laboratory TUT rates also reported more daily-
life TUTs (b = 1.29, SE = 0.61) [t(68) = 2.12, prep = .93] (see Figure 1). Note also that happiness moderated this 
effect (see Figure 2), such that when subjects were happier than usual it minimized the mind-wandering 
differences between subjects with high versus low laboratory TUT rates (b = −0.65, SE = 0.20) [t(68) = −3.26, 
prep = .99]. Neither SART accuracy (dL) nor RT variability (RTSD) significantly predicted daily-life TUTs [both 
ts(68) < 1.85]. 
 
In a more exploratory vein, we examined whether laboratory TUT rate predicted daily-life mind-wandering 
content. In fact, it predicted worrying (see Figure 3): When subjects’ daily-life thoughts were off task, those 
who had experienced more lab TUTs reported more worried content than did those who had experienced fewer 
lab TUTs (b = 1.49, SE = 0.53) [t(68) = 2.84, prep = .97]. Lab TUT rate did not predict any other mind-
wandering qualities. 
 
Performance in Daily-Life Activities 
 
Before we address the critical question of whether daily-life thoughts predicted performance, we point out that 
contextual factors predicted subjects’ self-reported success at daily-life tasks, as shown in Table 3. Subjects 
reported performing better when engaged in important or enjoyable activities, when concentrating or expending 
effort, or when happy. They reported performing worse when engaged in stressful, unappealing, or boring ac-
tivities, when in chaotic environments, or when anxious or tired. 
 
Of central importance, and as predicted, subjects’ performance ratings were lower while mind wandering than 
while mentally on task (b = −1.15, SE = .10) [t(71) = −11.69, prep > .99]. We also found that mind-wandering 
awareness and content predicted perceived performance. When subjects were aware that they had been mind 
wandering, they believed they had been performing better than when they had been mind wandering without 
awareness (b = .094, SE = .040) [t(71) = 2.34, prep _ .95]. 
 
This finding mirrors laboratory reports of increased task errors during mind-wandering episodes that lack 
―metaconsciousness‖ (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007, 2008). Finally, with respect to mind-
wandering content, when subjects experienced daily-life TUTs, their self-reported performance was worse with 
more worry- or fantasy-based content [for worry, b = −.072, SE = .027,  t(71) = −2.67, prep _ .97; for fantasy, b 
= −.105, SE _.026, t(71) = −4.02, prep > .99]; neither purposeful mind wandering nor variation in personal-
concern content predicted performance ratings (ts < 1.28, ps > .21). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We found that the propensity to mind wander is a stable cognitive characteristic, representing an individual dif-
ference that is reliable across time, activities, and contexts. Subjects with higher TUT rates during a laboratory 
executive-control task experienced more off-task thoughts during their unconstrained everyday activities. This 
relation held even though we measured daily-life TUTs several weeks after the initial lab assessment. Our TUT 
rate findings also differed in an important way from our previous results regarding laboratory measures of 
working memory capacity (WMC), which are correlated with, but not isomorphic to, laboratory TUT rates 
(McVay & Kane, 2009): Whereas WMC variation predicted daily-life mind-wandering differences only in 
cognitively demanding contexts (such as those perceived as requiring concentration; Kane et al., 2007), 
laboratory TUT rate variation predicted daily-life mind wandering across virtually all contexts. Thus, whatever 
variables, aside from WMC, contribute to high levels of mind wandering during laboratory tasks (e.g., 
personality, emotion, psychopathology, goals, recent life events), they assert their influence very broadly across 
people’s everyday lives and activities. 
 
Unexpectedly, we found that mood moderated the lab-to-life TUT relationship, with happiness being an equal-
izer. When people reported being especially happy in the moment, their laboratory TUT rate no longer predicted 
well whether they were currently mind wandering. We will not make too much of this unanticipated result. 
However, given that unhappiness exacerbated mind-wandering differences between lab TUTers and lab non-
TUTers, and that lab TUTers were especially likely to be worrying when they did mind wander in daily life, 
future mind-wandering research should draw upon allied work in the clinical and personality domains, on 
phenomena such as rumination and worry and their covariation with depression and anxi ety (e.g., Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & 
Phillips, 2009; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007; Watkins, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
Our study conceptually replicated, in daily life, the common laboratory finding that task performance suffers on 
occasions when people report off-task versus on-task thought (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009; Schooler et al., 2004; 
Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003; Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, & 
Schooler, 2007, 2008; Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davies, 2006). That is, subjects rated their ongoing activity 
performance to be worse when they were mind wandering than when they were mentally focused. Were these 
subjective reports valid? We believe so, although we could not measure subjects’ performance objectively 
outside the laboratory. We see evidence for validity in that subjects’ performance ratings varied systematically 
with contextual variables, metaconsciousness, and thought content, despite it being unlikely that subjects shared 
folk beliefs about the effects of metaconsciousness on performance, or about the effects of fantasy versus 
personal-concern thought content on performance. If we are right that the thought– performance relation is real, 
then the consistency with which our study and others find that 30%–40% of daily-life thoughts are off task 
(Hurlburt, 1979; Kane et al., 2007; Klinger, 1978/1979; Klinger & Cox, 1987/1988) suggests a need to take 
mind wandering seriously as an impediment to learning, productivity, and public safety (e.g., Reason, 1990; 
Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007; Wiegmann et al., 2005).
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As far as we know, our study is the first to demonstrate a relation between metaconsciousness and human 
performance outside the laboratory: Subjects performed their daily-life activities more poorly when they had 
been less aware, before the beep, of their TUTs. Our findings thus support the Smallwood and Schooler (2006; 
Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007) argument that mind wandering without meta-awareness of one’s 
mind wandering (or, ―zoning out‖) is particularly harmful to task performance. At the same time, our data, like 
theirs, suggest that mind wandering with awareness can have negative consequences. Figure 4 shows that, 
whereas increased awareness of mind wandering was associated with higher self-rated performance, even the 
highest levels of meta-awareness during mind wandering predicted considerably lower performance ratings than 
did on-task thoughts; thus, awareness of off-task thought does not necessarily trigger enough (or timely enough) 
conscious focus to prevent errors. Further laboratory and daily-life research should address the performance 
consequences of mind wandering with and without awareness (see also Smallwood, Fishman, & Schooler, 
2007; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008). 
 
Indeed, we suggest that mind wandering, in general, should become a phenomenon of choice in studies of con-
scious awareness, metacognition, executive control, and individual differences therein (see Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006). Unlike other theoretically diagnostic outcome variables, such as action slips, RT variability, 
and perseverative errors, mind wandering is readily observable (albeit indirectly) in a wide variety of laboratory 
tasks and ecological settings. Moreover, technological advances are increasingly allowing researchers to 
triangulate self-report, behavioral, and neuroimaging data as a means to better measure and understand mind 
wandering and other subjective experiences (e.g., Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; 
Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008). We contend that ecological and individual-
differences investigations of mind wandering, like the present one (see also Kane et al., 2007), should similarly 
contribute to building comprehensive theories of conscious awareness and control. 
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NOTES 
 
1. McVay and Kane (2009) also collected working memory capacity (WMC) data from these subjects, but 
the present sample was too small to detect WMC effects on daily-life mind wandering (it was only about 
half that of Kane et al., 2007). 
2. The significant effects on mind wandering in the present study for the ―effort‖ posed by current 
activities may have differed here from Kane et al. (2007) because we modified this prompt between 
studies. In the present study, the prompt asked whether one’s activity was mentally effortful, whereas 
Kane et al. did not use the ―mentally‖ qualifier (thus conflating physical and mental effort). 
3. We recognize the possibility that, although mind wandering is often detrimental to immediate task 
performance, it may serve the adaptive function of allowing people to keep their broader life goals 
mentally accessible (e.g., Klinger, 1971; Singer, 1968; Singer & Singer, 2006). 
